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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EVIDENCE-USE OF ILLEGALLY OBTAINED
EvmENCE AND DuE PROCESS OF LAw-It is fundamental, even in a
federal system, that a state be free to regulate the procedure of its courts
in accordance with its own conceptions of proper policy, subject only
to constitutional limitations safeguarding individuals from arbitrary
action by the state.1' In the United States this constitutional protection is two-fold-both state and federal constitutions acting as limitations
on state action. As a result, a problem arises as to what extent the federal courts can, in the enforcement of federal constitutional limitations,
override state criminal procedures and the policies underlying them.
It is clear that the states have, by virtue of the due process clause of
"the Fourteenth Amendment,2 subjected their administration of justice
to federal scrutiny; but the question remains whether this scrutiny
is limited to a super6.cial3 inquiry as to the existence and observance of
adequate minimum procedural safeguards (as established by prevailing Anglo-American mores), or whether it involves a deeper and more
philosophical inquiry into the underlying moral conduct and juridical
policies of the state; or translated into more rudimentary terms, whether
the state's conduct is to be judged in terms of deviation from established standards of society or in terms of deviation from standards
deemed to be ultimately desirable. The choice is essentially one as to
the proper judicial role: policeman or philosopher?
This problem has recently been brought to the forefront by the
rulings of the Su_preme Court in cases involving the use of illegally
obtained evidence to obtain convictions in state criminal proceedings.
Two cases (partly fictional for purposes of contrast, but with real life

1 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 at 285, 56 S.Ct. 461 (1936) and cases cited
therein.
2 " ••• nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law•..." U.S. CoNST., Amend. XIV.
3 Used in a d\!Scriptive, rather than derogatory, sense.
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counterparts) may be used to illustrate the present confusion created
in this arena. A state statute makes it a crime to possess morphine.
Police officers, suspecting defendant of violation of the statute, forcibly
enter his home without a search warrant and find a supply of capsules
containing the illegal drug. The Supreme Court is apparently committed to the doctrine that the capsules, though illegally obtained, are
admissible in evidence in the state courts.4 However, the plot thickens.
Before the officers can seize the capsules, the defendant swallows them,
whereupon he is seized and compelled to swallow a solution causing
the capsules to be coughed up. Rochin v. California5 indicates that
the capsules, when so obtained, may not constitutionally be used as
evidence against the defendant, despite their obvious probative value.
Such divergent results, whether or not morally justifiable, indicate
that the Court has transgressed the bounds of the superficial inquiry
and donned the robe of the philosopher. In a society which still regards ·punishment of the wrongdoer according to his legal wrong,
rather than according to his equitable position (either at the time of
· the crime6 or the time of the triaF),8 as the primary objective of the
criminal law, and which consequently regards the accurate ascertainment of the truth rather than the protection of the individual from the
state as the principal aim of criminal trial procedure,9 the Court has
prescribed a rule of evidence based solely on equitable grounds10 as a
4 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 69 S.Ct. 1359 (1949); holding reaffirlned in Stelfanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 72 S.Ct. 118 (1951).
Ii 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205 (1952).
6 E.g., the method by which the victim of a robbery acquired the property stolen from
him does not affect the thief's liability, nor does the fact that the thief was poor and starving and the person robbed a man of means alleviate the penalty; likewise, the law makes
no distinction between the mercy killing and the ordinary murder, or between the forgery
to collect a debt and the common forgery.
7 E.g., the fact that the thief voluntarily returned the stolen property or that the property was in turn stolen from him before he had an opportunity to enjoy it does not remove
or reduce his criminal liability; neither does the fact that he has suffered, either at the hands
of the victim or of the police, prior to the trial serve to alter his liability.
s The equitable position of the wrongdoer may well be taken into consideration by
the jury in arriving at their verdict, however. Also, the law does make some distinction in
severity of punishment based on certain equitable determination, such as intent of the
wrongdoer and his criminal propensities.
9 Since the fact of the wrong is the basis of punishment, the object of the trial must
be the accurate ascertainment of this fact. However, the present federal rules of evidence
seem to evidence a trend in Anglo-American jurisprudence toward the imposition of equitable standards. See PouND, Jusnc:s AccORDING TO LAw 22 (1951).
10 Since there could be no question as to the reliability of the capsules obtained from
the defendant's stomach to prove his guilt, the evidence must have been excluded because
of the inequitable method by which it was obtained _by the police. Apparently the Court
feels that such a procedure is much more unfair than the obtaining of evidence by an illegal
search or seizure.
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constitutional principle. It has superimposed its own conceptions of
proper policy on the state. The question is: has the Court properly
construed its function in this respect?

I
The Supreme Court's Approach

Analytically, the Court is both director and actor; the role it casts
for itself is the one it plays; its interpretation of the role is the one
that will govern the performance. Any critical evaluation of this interpretation must therefore start with a diagnosis of the characterization
which the Court itself has given to the part. Such a diagnosis must
he subject to an inherent limitation on the critic: what is basically an
inquiry into a subjective, sometimes even subconscious, state of the actor
can he based only on his objective pronouncements and actions.

A. The Confession Cases. The Supreme Court's initial inroads
into the domain of state evidentiary rules involved the use of coerced
confessions in criminal trials. As a general rule, confessions are admissible as evidence if, and only if, voluntarily given.11 Although this
test has sometimes been defended as a protection against self-incrimination,12 the traditional explanation has remained that confessions extracted by torture, either physical or psychological, are intrinsically
untrustworthy1 3 (an application of the general principle that duress
removes any assumption of validity, and perhaps even substitutes an
assumption of invalidity in place of it). This exclusionary rule of
evidence has become established in Anglo-American jurisprudence as
an essential ingredient of a fair trial, embodied in the concept of due
process of law.
Brown v. Mississippi14 provided an easy initial foothold in the
constitutional enforcement of this requirement. A state court had convicted three Negroes -of murder solely on the basis of confessions obtained from each of them after severe physical torture. A unanimous
Court ruled that the use of such unreliable evidence to convict constituted "a clear denial of du~ process,"15 analogizing the case to one
11 3 WIGMORB, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §§822-826 (1940).
12 Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 at 542, 18 S.Ct.
EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §823c (1940).
18 3 W10MoRB, EVIDENCE, 3d

183 (1897); cf. 3 W1GMORB,

ed., §822 (1940); Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S.
613 at 623, 16 S.Ct. 895 (1896).
14 297 U.S. 278, 56 S.Ct. 461 (1936).
15 Id. at 286, characterizing the trial as "a mere pretense."
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where the state knowingly uses perjured testimony ( which had previously been held to violate the constitutional mandate16 ) . A few
years later this beachhead was expanded to include confessions obtained
from defendants under mental duress.1 7 With this settled, the only
question that remained was whether the Court should lay down a
rule of law that all confessions obtained under various specified conditions were inherently unreliable or merely make an independent
fact determination, either on the undisputed or on all the facts, that
the particular confession was coerced and thus presumptively1 8 unreliable. Each prevailing majority has professed to be making an independent determination on the undisputed facts as measured against
constitutional standards,1 9 but dissenters have accused their brethren
of reweighing conflicting evidence on which a finding or verdict in
the trial court was based.2 ° Certainly the standards of conduct or rules
_of law formulated by various majorities may well be a thin disguise
for a _conclusion arrived at through a subjective evaluation of all of the
evidence.
The rule of evidence excluding involuntary. or coerced confessions
may well serve a function in addition to assuring a fair trial; it may
serve as a means of disciplining police officers by denying them the
fruits of their illegal activity. The philosophy is that the motive to
coerce confessions will be removed if such confessions can .not be used
to prove guilt. However, this rationale must be based on the assumption that the confession will not materially aid the police in obtaining
other evidence of the defendant's guilt, an assumption which may well
be questioned. This additional function of the exclusionary rules becomes important only when it is used as an independent basis for denying the admissibility -of confessions. Two such applications are possible: (I) where the coerced confession is substantiated by other evidence, and (2) where the confession, though voluntary, is obtained
while the police are engaged in an illegal activity. The wisdom of
using such a policy to support a rule of evidence21 is debatable, but
16 Mooney v. Ho1ohan, 294 U.S. 103, 55 S.Ct. 340 (1935).
17 Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 60 S.Ct. 472 (1940).
18 This presumption may be either conclusive or rebuttable,

depending on the juris·
10 Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 at 153-155, 64 S.Ct. 921 (1944); Malinski v.
New York, 324 U.S. 401, 65 S.Ct. 781 (1945); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 69 S.Ct.
1347 (1949); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 72 S.Ct. 591 (1952).
20 Ashcraft v. Tennessee, supra note 19 at 156; Malinski v. New York, supra note 19
at 434; Watts v. Indiana, supra note 19 at 57.
21 It may be noted that the rule of evidence supports the policy of disciplining police
officers as well as the policy supports the rule of evidence.
diction.
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each state is free to do so if it wishes; the enforcement by the Supreme
Court of such a policy as a constitutional requirement, however, would
seem very questionable.22 Thus, although the Court in the exercise
of its supervisory power over the lower federal courts has established
a rule of evidence requiring the exclusion of confessions received during a detention illegal because of unnecessary delay in arraignment
regardless of their voluntary or inyoluntary character,23 it has refused
to enforce this rule on the states through the due process clause.24
Whether this practice will be followed as to the admissibility of coerced
confessions where their truthfulness is substantially confirmed by other
evidence appears doubtful however.211
B. The Illegal Search and Seizure Cases. In the federal courts,
evidence obtained by federal officers in violation of the Fourth Amendment26 is inadmissible against a party having standing to raise the
the objection, provided a timely motion is made for its exclusion.27
The question remains open, however, as to whether this result is dictated by the Constitution or is merely a rule of evidence imposed by
the Supreme Court in the exercise of its supervisory control over the
federal judicial system. On the one hand it can be argued that the
protection of the Fourth Amendment is essentially destroyed if the
fruits of its violation are to be used to convict; that to so read it is to
ignore realities and make the command a whisper; that therefore the
amendment by implication requires the exclusion of evidence so obtained. In the rebuttal it may be said that there is no suggestion of
such a sanction in the words of the amendment; that such a rule was
22 See

infra part III of this comment.
2s McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608 (1943).
24 Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 72 S.Ct. 141 (1951).
211 While the point has never been precisely ruled upon, the opinion in Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165 at 173-174, indicates that the admission of substantiated confessions would be regarded as a violation of due process. Apparently this conclusion must be
derived by implication from the statements of various minority justices (e.g., Justice Jackson's separate opinion in Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 at 60, and the two companion cases
decided at the same time) to the effect that there was evidence substantiating the confessions ruled on. The problem is discussed in l BAYLOR L. REv. 171 (1948). Dictum in
Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, is also to the effect that substantiated confessions are
inadmissible.
26 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated••••" U.S. CONST., Amend.
IV.
27Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341 (1914). The motion is considered timely if it is made at the first opportunity, whether this be before the trial, Weeks
v. United States, supra, or at the time the evidence is introduced, Gouled v. United States,
255 U.S. 298, 41 S.Ct. 261 (1921). Where the facts as to the illegal seizure are not in
dispute, a motion at the trial is apparently timely enough even though there was prior
opportunity, Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 46 S.Ct. 4 (1926).
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unknown at common law; and that therefore the exclusion can be only
justified as a-rule of evidence designed to further the basic policy of
preventing violations of the constitutional prohibition. Since the nine
men on the bench have never been called upon directly to decide the
point, which is not entirely an academic one,28 circumstantial evidence
must be examined to determine its probable resolution. The reasoning
of the Court and the expression of opinions in dictum in relation to
the problem have utilized both approaches at various times,29 although
the rule of evidence designation appears to be currently favored.30
One other scrap of evidence is the non-application of the exclusionary
rule to evidence obtained solely by state officers by an illegal search
and seizure and subsequently turned over to federal authorities.31 The
rationale given for this exception is that the Fourth Amendment applies
only to the federal government and its officers; consequently, an ex_dusionary rule based on the Fourth Amendment can have no application to evidence procured by state officials. If the exclusion of the
evidence is a rule dictated by the Constitution, this reasoning, while
valid on its face, ignores the reasoning supporting the exclusionary
rule, .i.e., that the Fourth Amendment can have no real meaning if
evidence obtained by such means is admissible in the federal courts.32
On the other hand, if the exclusion is purely a procedural rule, the
exception to it, while making rather an arbitrary distinction, can be
justified if the underlying policy to be served is merely one of disciplining or frustrating violations of the Fourth Amendment and not also
of excluding the evidence because of the illegal method by which it
28 The resolution of this point is determinative of Congress's power to change the exclusionary rule, and also of the applicability of the rule to the states even if it is assumed
that the Fourth Amendment is incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment due process
clause.
29 Constitutional requirement: Weeks v. United ·States, 232 U.S. 383; implication
from statement in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 at 468, 48 S.Ct. 564 (1928)
that the Supreme Court has no power, without the sanction of congressional enactment, "to
exclude evidence, the admission of which is not unconstitutional, because unethically secured"; implication from failure of Court in McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 at
341, to include the Weeks rule in the list of evidentiary rules formulated by the Court in
its supervisory capacity; also see cases listed in McNabb v. United States, supra at 339.
Rule of evidence: see note 30 infra.
so Justice Black: Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 at 39-40; United States v. Rabinowitz,
339 U.S. 56, 70 S.Ct. 430 (1950). By implication: Wolf v. Colorado, supra at 28.
s1 Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 41 S.Ct. 574 (1921).
32 If the Fourth Amendment requires the federal exclusionary rule as a prohibition on
the federal courts of the use of evidence obtained by means of an illegal search and seizure,
then the fact that the illegal search and seizure was conducted by other than federal officers
can have no significance, particularly since the state's action in so obtaining evidence is also
unconstitutional, see note 34 infra. If the rule is a constitutional one, it is the use by the
federal courts, not the obtaining by federal officers, that is important.
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was obtained. Therefore, an examination of the circumstantial evidence would seem to indicate that the federal exclusionary rule is regarded as essentially a procedural, rather than a constitutional, requirement.
In line with this analysis, it is not surprising that a divided Court,
in the case of Wolf v. Colorado,33 held that the federal exclusionary
rule is not binding on the states, even though the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures by the states.34 The majority of the Court was impressed with
the possible probative value of such evidence, the existence of other
remedies to punish the abuse, the failure of the states to accept the
exclusionary rule as a remedy necessary to protect the right, and the
less compelling need to stand guard against misconduct by the state
police, who, it was thought, are more sensitive to public opinion than
are federal officers. The dissent3 5 was concerned mainly with the inadequacy of the alternative remedies available and the irony of allowing the state to enjoy the ill-gotten fruits of a forbidden tree. It should
be noted that the minority view has to make two basic assumptions:
(I) the federal exclusionary rule is dictated by the Fourth Amendment, and (2) the due process clause incorporates the Fourth Amendment;36 the majority view, on the other hand, follows if either of these
premises is defeated. The result: not only was the Court split, but
the majority of the Court was also split:3 7-a majority in flesh, but not
in spirit.
C. The Rochin Case. The case of Rochin v. California3 8 is the
Court's latest invasion into the realm of state evidentiary rules. The
result was a reversal of a conviction gained through the abusive use
of a stomach pump as a violation of due process requirements, although
most states would probably not have required an exclusion of the
evidence as an original proposition.39 Oddly enough, all of the justices
reached the same result, although not on the same grounds. A masa 338 U.S. 25, 69 S.Ct. 1359 (1949).
34Jd. at 28.
35 Justices Douglas, Mmphy, and Rutledge, id. at 40. See 58 YALE L.J. 144 (1949)
on question of adequacy of alternative remedies.
36 It is obvious that the exclusionary rule cannot be required of the states by the
Constitution unless it is required of the federal government by the Constitution. Since the
Fourth Amendment is the constitutional grounds used to support the federal rule, it must
mean that the requirements of this amendment are made applicable to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment if the rule is required of the states.
37 Justice Black was split from the rest of the majority. However, this still left a
majority of the Court supporfuig Justice Frankfurter's opinion.
ss 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205 (1951).
39 See Douglas' opinion, id. at 177-178.
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jority of the Court thought that the confession cases, citing the Brown
case, were controlling. These cases were interpreted as excluding the
evid~nce not only because of its unreliability, but also because the
method of obtaining the evidence offends "the community's sense of
fair play and decency ."40 The conclusion is that "it would be a stultification of the responsibility which the course of constitutional history has cast upon this Court to hold that in order to convict a man
the police cannot extract by force what is in his mind but can extract
what is in his stomach."41 The Wolf case, which would seem to be a
closer analogy, is completely ignored.42 Instead, stress is placed on
the fact that force was used to compel the defendant to surrender the
evidence rather than on the fact that the evidence was obtained
illegally. The concurring minority,43 on the other hand, completely
rejects this approach, but arrives at the same result by arguing that the
privilege against self-incrimination has been violated and that this
privilege is an inherent part of the Fourteenth Amendment. Both of
these contentions are clearly against the great weight of authority.44
Thus the Court stands at present.
D. Summary. Three basic principles may be drawn from the
above cases. (1) The confession cases basically indicate that the concept of due process of law requires the exclusion of unreliable evidence
in order to insure a fair trial. (2) Taken in conjunction with the Rochin
case, they also indicate that the element of compulsion alone, aside
from its effect on reliability, is sufficient to prohibit the use of evidence
so obtained.45 (3) However, mere illegal detention or illegal search
and seizure, absent any compulsion, is not sufficient to invoke the due
process clause exclusionary requirement.
40 Id. at
41 Ibid.

173.

42 The only possible reference to the Wolf ~e is the statement: "We therefore put to
one side cases which have arisen in State courts through use of modern methods and
devices for discovering wrongdoers and bringing them to book." Obviously this is a farfetched reference at best. Id. at 174.
,
48 Justices Black and Douglas, id. at 174 and 177.
44 Scope of privilege: 8 W1cMoRE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §§2263-2265 (1940); Inbau,
"Self-Incrimination-What Can An Accused Person Be Compelled To Do?" 28 J. CmM.
L. 261 (1937); Morgan, "The Law of Evidence 1941-1945," 9 HARv. L. REv. 481 at
519-523 (1946). Non-incorporation into Fourteenth Amendment: Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46, 67 S.Ct. 1672 (1947).
45 The fingerprint and physical examination of the defendant cases may require this
proposition to be limited to the removal of something from the body or mind (i.e., internal
removal) of the defendant by force. However, if more than reasonable force is used by
the police to obtain the defendant's fingerprints, etc., the Rochin rule might be held
applicable.
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These three principles do not represent a consistent approach to
the Court's role under the due process clause however. The policing
of state procedural safeguards to insure the exclusion of unreliable
evidence at the trial is markedly different from the chastisement of
the state for its failure to punish police misconduct by the exclusion
of reliable and relevant evidence. The former requires merely that
the state's procedural rules conform to established legal standards;46
the latter requires that the state's rules of procedure meet ethical
standards of fair play as well. 47 This conflict might well be titled "legal
justice v. equitable justice: rules of evidence and the judicial conscience."48
This same conflict is also manifested in other divisions of the Court.
Thus the splitting of the Justices in the confession cases ov~r whether
a factual £nding of coercion raising a presumption of unreliability is
required to reverse a state conviction, or only a £nding of circumstances
which as a matter of constitutional law render the confession inherently
unreliable, is a reflection of the same basic conflict as to the scope of
the Court's reviewing powers under the due process clause. 49 The
division in the Wolf case is but another example.50 This suggests that
one of the basic causes of the inconsistent approach of the Court to the .
various problems is that there are nine actors and only one role to play.
As a result of this casting problem, the opinion of the Court in
any particular case must be read in the light of the particular Justice's
interpretation of the character of due process of law. Justices Black
and Douglas, as strong exponents of individual civil rights, favor an
interpretation of the Constitution which requires the exclusion of
evidence obtained by police misconduct. The Fifth Amendment prohibition against self-incrimination is their basic focal point,51 but the
'46 As pointed out earlier, the use of such unreliable evidence as coerced confessions,
etc., is clearly against all modern standards of civilized justice.
47 See note 10 supra. Also see Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 at l 73.
48 See PoOND, Jusncn AccoRDING To I.Aw, c. 9 (1951), for distinction between
a legal and equitable justice. Basically the distinction revolves around whether each person
should be punished for his own wrongs without regard to the equities in his favor or
whether a balance should be struck between the parties on their relative equities.
4 9 If the Court makes a factual finding of coercion, then the evidence is required to
be excluded because of the violation of accepted reliability standards. On the other hand, if
a rule of law is laid down that confessions obtained under certain circumstances are required
to be excluded because unreliable as a matter of law (rather.than fact), then the Court is
enforcing a policy determination on the states.
50 If the federal exclusionary rule of evidence had been imposed on the states, the
Court would have been imposing its own conceptions of policy on the states, since the
federal rule is based on purely policy grounds. However, the approach of the majority
indicated that it was applying the "established legal standard" test, since it made a finding
of fact that the federal rule was not generally accepted by civilized legal systems.
51 See opinions in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 at 174 and 177.
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unreasonable search and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment is
also utilized.52 These exclusionary rules are then enforced against the
states by interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment as a short-hand
codification of the entire first eight amendments.53 They are definitely
opposed to the use of the due process clause to formulate ethereal concepts of fundamental justice enforceable against the states. 54 Justices
Murphy and Rutledge may also be classified with this school of thought
for present purposes.55 All of the remaining Justices are opposed to this
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Frankfurter,
while also an exponent of individual civil rights, takes a diametrically
opposite position from Justices Black and Douglas. His position is
that the due process clause is entirely divorced from the first eight
amendments, but that it requires the observance by the states of
"fundamental concepts of fairness and justice."56 With this flexible
concept to work with, his position in any particular case depends upon
his sub1ective balancing of the equities of the situation within the
bounds of accepted notions of justice,5 7 as evidenced by the fact that
he wrote the majority opinion in both the Wolf and the Rochin cases.
Chief Justice Stone also adopted essentially this position, with th~
qualifi.catiqn that the state's determination of the basic policy question
by a balancing of the equities was to be given effect unless it was completely contrary to any reasonable concept of faimess. 58 Consequently,
under Stone's approach the states would be required to exclude only
unreliable or· irrelevant evidence. Justice Reed and former Justice
52 See Justice Douglas' opinion in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 2~ at 40. But cf. Justice Black's opinion in same case, id. at 39.
63 See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 at 68. For a criticism of this position, see
Fairman and Morrison, "Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?"
2 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949); Kauper, ''The First Ten Amendments," 37 A.B.A.J. 717 at
780 (1951).
54 See dissents in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 at 68; Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165 at 174.
55 See dissents in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 at 123; Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25 at 41 and 47. They differ from Justices Black and Douglas in that they would not
limit the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal bill of rights.
56 Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 at 607, 68 S.Ct. 302 (1948). ''The Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has an independent potency, precisely as does the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in relation to the Federal Government." ''The
Amendment neither comprehends the specific provisions by which the founders deemed it
appropriate to restrict the federal government nor is it confined to them." Adamson v.
California, 332 U.S. 46 at 66. "Judicial review of that guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment inescapably imposes upon this Court an exercise of judgment upon the whole course
of the proceedings in order to ascertain whether they offend those canons of decency and
fairness which express the notj.ons of justice of English-speaking peoples." Id. at 67. See
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, also.
57See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 at 169-172.
liS See dissenting opinion in Malinski v. New Y:ork, 324 U.S. 401, 65 S.Ct. 781
(1945).

1952]

COMMENTS

1377

Roberts may generally be regarded as opposed to federal interference
with state evidentiary rules except where such rules result in fundamental unfairness.119 The flexibility of their position is intermediary
between those of Frankfurter and Stone. While they also differ from
Frankfurter and Stone in their belief that some of the first eight amendments are incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment by a process of
selective assimilation,60 they do recognize that the federal exclusionary
rules of evidence have no constitutional compulsion behind them. 61
Justice Jackson, a firm opponent of exclusionary rules based solely
on a policy of preventing police misconduct, would not give any such
rules constitutional sanction either.62 Consequently, he would look
only at the reliability of the evidence in applying the due process clause,
thus approaching, but not reaching, Stone's position from a direction
opposite to that of the other Justices. 63 The remainder of the present
Justices have not expressed their opinion in writing in this field, but
have usually sided with Justice Reed. 64 The Court's position in any
case is thus the product of the interplay of these varying philosophies.

II
The Better Approach

A. A Historical Perspective. An orderly legal procedure is one
of the essential requirements of a civilized society. In recognition of
this, the Magna Carta guarantees that "no freeman shall be taken,
or imprisoned, or disseized, or outlawed, or banished, or any ways destroyed, nor will we go upon him, nor send upon him, except by the
legal judgment of his peers or by the law of the land."611 Out of this
guarantee evolved the due process clause of the Fifth, and later the
Fourteenth, Amendrnent.66 While the concept was clearly a pro59 See Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 at 236-238, 62 S.Ct. 280 (1941); Adam•
son v. California, 332 U.S. 46 at 57.
60 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S 46.
6 1 E.g., Justice Reed supported the majority opinion in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25,
69 S.Ct. 1359 (1949), which held that while the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the
guarantee of the Fourth Amendment, it did not require exclusion of the evidence.
62 See Justice Jackson's dissenting opinions in Ashcraft v. Tennesse, 322 U.S. 143 at
156; Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 at 57. Jackson also supported the decision in Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25.
63 I.e., Justice Jackson would limit the Court's power of review of state policy determination to an even greater degree than Stone. Therefore, it is difficult to understand Jackson's failure to dissent in the Rochin case.
64 See Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596; Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49; Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25; Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46; Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165.
65 Chapter 39 of the Magna Carta as translated by 1 STUBBS 659.
66 STORY, ON nm CONSTITUTION, 5th ed., §§1941-1944 (1891), and cases cited
therein.
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cedural one-a_guarantee of a fair hearing-at the time of its incorporation into the Constitution,67 its protection was gradually expanded,
under the influence of natural law68 ' concepts, to include certain substantive rights regarded as fundamental. 69 A corollary of this development was the broadening of the procedural due· process guarantee to
incorporate the concept of "fundamental justice."70
. With such flexible standards within which to work, it is not surprising that the individual philosophies of the various Justices have played
a major part in the molding of the broad general contours of the due
process clause through the gradual process of judicial delimitation.
The unifying interest in protecting the individual's freedom of will,
combined with divergent philosophies as to the extent to which the
collective interest of society should be allowed to restrain the actions
of the individual and also as to the power of the federal government
.to override policies deemed desirable by the individual states, led the
Court to decide individual cases without regard to any underlying
unifying principle to be used as a touchstone. 71 The suggestion that
due process was fln embodiment of the federal bill of rights (i.e., the
first eight amendments) was rejected.72 Any other set of specific
"commandments" would presumptively have suffered the same fate.
But in 1937, out of the maze of cases already then in existence, Justice
Cardozo tendered a unifying hypothesis:
"There ·emerges the perception of a rationalizing principle
which gives to discrete instances a proper order and coherence.
The right to trial by jury and the immunity from prosecution
except as the result of an indictment may have value and importance. Even so, they are not of the very essence of a scheme of
ordered liberty. To abolish them is not to violate a 'principle of
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as
to be ranked as fundamental.' Few would be so narrow and pro67 Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 at 105 (1878); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
714 (1878).
·
68 See Grant, "The Natural Law Background of Due Process," 31 Cot. L. REv. 56
(1931). "In fact, the modern definition of 'due process' is merely the 'natural justice' of
Story, Marshall, Miller, Field, et al. under a new name, 'reasonableness.' " Id. at 65.
69 This growth is described in Haimes, "Judicial Review of Legislation in the United
'States and the Doctrine of Vested Rights and of Implied Limitations of Legislatures," 3
TEX. L. REv. 1 (1924).
70 Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312 at 316, 47 S.Ct. 103 (1926); Foster v. lliinois,
332 U.S. 134, 67 S.Ct. 1716 (1947); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 58 S.Ct. 149
(1937).
71 Of course, the general legal training of the individual justices undoubtedly operated
to prescribe certain subjective guiding principles, as Cardozo so aptly described in Tm;
NATURE OF nm JUDICI4 PROCESS.
72 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.

46; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319.
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vincial as to maintain that fair and enlightened system of justice
would be impossible without them." 73
This has become the basic test, at least verbally, of due process of
law. 74 This is not to suggest that due process, as so defined, is a
molded concept incapable of reflecting a changing social philosophy;75
rather it is a recognition that growth and change must be geared to a
criterion which is itself at all times an end product of current social
thought if they are to reflect accurately accepted, rather than idio- ·
syncratic individual, standards.

B. What Is Due Process? Due process may be summarized then
as a protection of the personal rights of the individual against arbitrary
action by the state. Translated into procedural concepts, this means
that the individual is guaranteed "a fair trial." However, the Rochin
case, together with the Rochin interpretation of the confession cases,
interprets "fair" to mean the opposite of "unethical" rather than of
"arbitrary." While both of these terms, being value concepts, inherently
involve philosophical determinations, the standards looked to differ
measurably. "Arbitrary" merely means material deviation from a
standard of conduct having virtually universal approval, the test being
whether the standard sought to be enforced by the state is generally
followed. "Unethical" on the other hand requires an inquiry into
whether a particular standard, whether or not generally accepted, is
good or bad in the abstract (i.e., desirable or undesirable in relation
to some ultimate indefinable standard). Therefore, while the traditional view of due process regarded it as primarily a legal concept,
requiring an objective determination of fact as to the existence of a
generally accepted basic right in civilized judicial systems,_ the Rochin
view of due process treats it as essentially an equitable concept, requiring
a more philosophical and subjective policy determination. In other
words, the Rochin view involves a judicial balancing of the equities
of the parties, the parties being the public in the collective capacity of
the state on the one hand and the public in an individual capacity on
the other.76 The fact that the inadequacy of other remedies and the
73 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
74 Whether this is the actual test

319 at 325.
utilized is difficult to ascertain, particularly in the
light of Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165.
• 75 ''Experience has confirmed the wisdom of our predecessors in refusing to give a
rigid scope to this phrase. It expresses a demand for civilized standards of law. It is thus
not a stagnant formulation of what has been achieved in the past but a standard for judgment in the progressive evolution of the institutions of a free society." Malinski v. New
York, 324 U.S. 401 at 414, 65 S.Ct. 781 (1945).
76 In other words, the Court balances the interest of the public in solving the crime
and punishing the criminal against the interest of the individual to be free from abusive
treatment by the state.
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unclean hands of the plaintiff state are regarded as important factors
demonstrates that this is essentially a plea to the judicial conscience.77
Thus the conflict can be resolved into one basically between legal and
equitable justice.78

III
Conclusions
The difference in approaches is apparent. Whether the Rochin
approach should be approved is problematical. The basic inquiry must
be to the question of what is the proper function of the Court unde:i;
the due process clause. If the Court is merely the guardian of the
fundamental rights of the individual, 79 the Rochin approach must be
rejected and the traditional view reaffirmed. If the Court is also to
determine what rights the individual should have, the Rochin approach
must be accepted. However, under the constitutional separation of
powers doctrine, which is basic to the American form of government,
policy determinations are generally regarded as legislative, rather
than judicial, matters. 80 Besides, the analogical nature of judicial
reasoning and the removal of the judiciary from direct popular control
do not make the courts a particularly suitable body for determining
proper policy. In addition, the federal government has no power to
prescribe local policies for the states, who have the status of quasisovereigns under the constitutional division of powers, except in the
exercise of federal powers. However, with the present concern by the
Court over individual rights, it may be predicted that the Rochin
approach will continue to be utilized where the members of the Court,
or at least a majority of them, find that the state, through its officers, has
engaged in particularly obnoxious conduct.81

Allan Neef, S.Ed.
77The dissent in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, and the majority opinion in Rochin
v. California, 342 U.S. 165, evidence this. Whether other equitable doctrines will also
be applied can only be speculated on.
78 See supra note 48.
79 As those rights are determined by society in general.
so That the legislature is sometimes slow to act, see PouND, JusTicE AccoRDING To
LAw, c. 3 (1951).
81 The Rochin reasoning would directly apply to such things as blood tests, as Justice
Douglas recognizes in his separate opinion in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 at 177.
However, in Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 72 S.Ct. 509 (1952), the Court completely
ignored the Rochin reasoning where the petitioner in a habeas. corpus proceeding was
forcibly abducted by state officers so that the courts of the state could acquire criminal
jurisdiction over him.

